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AN OVERLOOKED KEY TO REVERSING MASS 
INCARCERATION: REFORMING THE LAW TO REDUCE 
PROSECUTORIAL POWER IN PLEA BARGAINING 
 
Cynthia Alkon

 
 
 
“Mass incarceration makes our country worse off, and we need to do 
something about it…”1 
 
-  President Barack Obama, July 14, 2015 
 
The need to “do something” about mass incarceration is now 
widely recognized.  When President Obama announced plans to 
reform federal criminal legislation, he focused on the need to change 
how we handle non-violent drug offenders and parole violators.
2
  
Previously, former Attorney General Eric Holder announced policies 
to make federal prosecutors “smart on crime.”3  These changes reflect, 
as President Obama noted, the increasing bipartisan consensus on the 
need for reform and the need to reduce our incarceration rates.
4
  
                                                 
© 2015 Cynthia Alkon. 
 
Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Thank you to Professors 
Catherine Hancock, Renée McDonald Hutchins, and Sanjay Chhablani.  Thank you 
also to the other participants in the South Eastern Association of Law Schools 
(SEALS) Discussion Group on Reversing Mass Incarceration: What Reforms are 
Working (or Could Work) and Why? for their useful comments and insights on the 
topic, including Aliza Plener Cover, Roger Fairfax, David Grey, Janet C. Hoeffel, 
Vida B. Johnson, Melanie Reid, Stephen I. Singer, Neil L. Sobol, Donald Tibbs, and 
Michael Vitiello. 
1
 Roberta Rampton, Obama Calls for Criminal Justice Reform by End of Year, 
REUTERS (July 14, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/14/us-usa-justice-
obama-idUSKCN0PO2UO20150714#7sf80tcKS4JFA1iJ.97. 
2
 See generally Barack Obama, President of the U. S., Remarks at the NAACP 
Conference (July 14, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/07/14/remarks-president-naacp-conference.  
3 Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar 
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html. 
4 
See Obama, supra note 2 (“In fact, today, back in Washington, Republican senators 
from Utah and Texas are joining democratic senators from New Jersey and Rhode 
Island to talk about how Congress can pass meaningful criminal justice reform this 
year.”); see also Eliza Collins, Chris Christie Calls for “Fresh Approach” to 
Criminal Justice, POLITICO (July 16, 2015), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/chris-christie-criminal-justice-reform-2016-
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However, proposals about what to reform, such as President Obama’s, 
tend to focus on some parts of criminal sentencing and on 
prosecutorial behavior as stand-alone issues.  These reform 
suggestions do not consider the fact that ninety-four to ninety-seven 
percent of criminal cases are resolved through plea bargains
5
 and how 
the use of this process influences incarceration rates.  Prosecutors hold 
extraordinary power in the criminal justice system.  They not only 
decide what cases get filed, they also decide what charges and 
enhancements are added, and whether there will be a plea offer.
6
  The 
structures of our criminal justice system, at both the state and federal 
level, strengthen prosecutorial power and create a plea bargaining 
environment with extreme power imbalances.
7
  Prosecutors use this 
power to put pressure on defendants to accept plea deals, which 
contribute to the high incarceration rates in the United States.  
Therefore, any reform intended to make a meaningful reduction in 
incarceration rates should recognize the power that prosecutors hold 
and include reform aimed at changing this underlying structure.   
 
As is well documented, the United States has high 
incarceration rates
8 
and imprisons more people than any nation in the 
                                                                                                                   
120228.html, for a discussion on a prominent Republican politician calling for 
criminal justice system reform. 
5 
See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (citing Dept. of Justice, Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, Table 5.22.2009, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf). 
6
 In limited circumstances defendants can plead open to the court, but in those cases 
there will be no charge bargaining as the defendant will need to “plead to the sheet.” 
See Kyle Graham, Crimes Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge 
Content, Pleas, and Trials, 100 CAL. L. REV.1573, 1589 (2012). 
7 
See Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining:  
The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 598-601 (2014) 
(discussing the power imbalances in plea bargaining).  
8 
The incarceration rate in the United States is 698 per 100,000 people. Highest to 
Lowest Prison Population Rate, THE INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-
lowest/prison_population_rate?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All (last visited Sept. 22, 
2015). Likewise, the U. S. incarcerates 2.2 million people. Incarceration, 
SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=107. 
The Seychelles has a higher incarceration rate than the United States at 868 per 
100,000. Id.  However, as of 2008, the population of the Seychelles was just over 
82,000 people. Seychelles, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, 
http://www.ciaworldfactbook.us/africa/seychelles.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2015). 
Alkon   
2015]   REVERSING MASS INCARCERATION 193 
 
 
world.
9
  African American and Latino communities suffer even higher 
incarceration rates.
10
  Our incarceration rates increased dramatically in 
the 1980s and into the 1990s.  Some commentators identify the “war 
on drugs” as a major contributor to increasing incarceration rates 
during this period.
11
  Others suggest that the increase is due to a 
number of factors including changes in criminal codes that increased 
potential penalties for crimes across the board, not only for drug 
crimes.
12
  One scholar, John F. Pfaff, concludes that the single biggest 
reason for increased incarceration rates since 1990 is not an increase in 
arrests, or harsher sentencing, or the drug war, but instead is an 
                                                                                                                   
So the total number of people incarcerated, 734, is a fraction of the 2.2 million in the 
United States. 
9 
The U. S. incarcerates 2.2 million people. Incarceration, SENTENCING PROJECT, 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=107. In comparison, China 
incarcerates 1.65 million, however, these numbers may not be complete. China, 
INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/china (“The 
Deputy Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate reported in 2009 
that, in addition to the sentenced prisoners, more than 650,000 were held in detention 
centers in China. If this was still correct in mid-2014 the total prison population in 
China was more than 2,300,000.”). 
10  
See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Mass Incarceration:  The Silence of the Judges, N.Y. 
REV. OF BOOKS, May 21, 2015, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/may/21/mass-incarceration-silence-
judges/ (noting “[o]ver 840,000, or nearly 40 percent of the 2.2 million US prisoners 
are African-American males. Put another way, about one in nine African-American 
males between the ages of twenty and thirty-four is now in prison. . . . 
Approximately 440,000 or 20 percent of the 2.2 million US prisoners are Hispanic 
males.”). 
11
 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 59 (2010); see also Steven B. Duke, Mass 
Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the Drug War: A Penological and Humanitarian 
Disgrace, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 17, 24 (2009). 
12
 See, e.g., Alkon, supra note 7, at 585–87; See also MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT:  
THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2015), for a 
political analysis of the variety of factors responsible for mass incarceration and the 
challenges this poses to reform. Gottschalk notes:  
For those seeking to dismantle the carceral state, the key challenge 
is not trying to determine what specific sentencing and other 
reforms would slash the number of people in jail and prison. The 
real challenge is figuring out how to create a political environment 
that is more receptive to such reforms and how to make the far 
reaching consequences of the carceral state into a leading political 
and public policy issue. 
Id. at 2. 
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increase in the percentage of felony filings per arrest.
13
  Pfaff 
concludes that the reason there are more filings is because prosecutors 
are filing a higher percentage of cases and therefore prosecutors are 
the predominate reason for mass incarceration.
14
   
 
This article will begin by briefly describing how plea 
bargaining works and the often coercive atmosphere of plea 
bargaining that contributes to mass incarceration.  This article will 
then discuss Pfaff’s conclusions, based on his empirical studies, that 
prosecutors are the key reason for mass incarceration.  Building on 
Pfaff’s conclusions on the key role prosecutors play in mass 
incarceration, this article will discuss how the current structure of both 
state and federal codes reinforce prosecutorial power, particularly in 
the plea bargaining process.  This article will then discuss two 
proposals for legislative reform that could decrease the coercive 
atmosphere of plea bargaining.  First, this article will recommend 
revising how crimes are defined, reducing the number of crimes that 
can be charged as both misdemeanors and felonies and reducing some 
felonies to misdemeanors.  Second, this article will recommend 
reducing potential punishment ranges by eliminating mandatory 
minimums for most crimes and for enhancements.  Legislative change 
alone will not reverse mass incarceration, but targeted legislative 
reform could help to change the overly coercive atmosphere of plea 
bargaining.  This effort can help to change the prosecutorial culture 
that surrounds plea bargaining and contribute to reducing incarceration 
rates.
15
  
 
I.  PLEA BARGAINING CULTURE 
 
Plea bargaining, is a form of negotiation with structural power 
imbalances.
16
  Essentially, prosecutors can decide what charges to file, 
                                                 
13
 John. F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1239, 1242 (2012) [hereinafter Pfaff, Causes of Prison Growth]. 
14
 Id. at 1241. 
15
 Other reforms that could have far-reaching effect include better internal regulation 
by prosecutor offices. See generally Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black 
Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129 (2008) (advocating for better internal regulation by 
prosecutors). Miller & Wright state, “Indeed, we believe that internal regulation can 
deliver even more than advocates of external regulation could hope to achieve.” Id. 
16
 See Alkon, supra note 7, at 582–87 (discussing prosecutorial power as it impacts 
pleas bargaining). 
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what enhancements to file, and what plea offer to make.
17
  In fact, our 
criminal justice system consists of a variety of players who exercise 
discretion at every level from police officers through to judges.
18
  
However, prosecutors hold the greatest discretionary power as they 
decide what charges and enhancements to file and those decisions 
determine how much pressure the defendant faces to accept a plea 
offer.
19
  Once a prosecutor makes a plea offer, defendants are often 
faced with few choices beyond taking the deal or rejecting it and 
getting a worse deal or worse sentence after trial.
20
  Defendants are 
pressured by the barriers to fighting their case and the possibly severe 
sentences they could face after trial.
21
  For example, they may not be 
able to raise the bail, and therefore have to decide between pleading 
                                                 
17
 Id. at 582. See also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal 
Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2124  (1998) (describing prosecutorial power as 
more administrative in nature and criticizing the failure to recognize this and 
regulate prosecutors). The author states, “because our governing ideology does not 
admit that prosecutors adjudicate guilt and set punishments, the procedures by which 
they do so are neither formally regulated nor invariably followed.” Id. 
18
 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 88–96 (1969), for a more 
complete analysis of discretion in the legal system. See also Cynthia Alkon, Plea 
Bargaining as a Legal Transplant: A Good Idea for Troubled Criminal Justice 
Systems? 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 355, 390 (2010). See John F. Pfaff, 
Waylaid by a Metaphor:  A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2013), for a stronger statement. Pfaff states, “[t]he 
criminal justice “system” in the United States is not a single system, but a mélange 
of feuding institutions with differing constituencies and incentives.” Id. 
19 
See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor, 23 CRIM. JUST. 24, 27–30 
(2008) (discussing prosecutorial discretion and how prosecutors can misuse this 
power). Individual prosecutors, due to their broad discretionary power, can handle 
similar cases in vastly different ways. See, e.g. Robert J. Smith, America’s Deadliest 
Prosecutors, SLATE (May 14, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/05/america_s_d
eadliest_prosecutors_death_penalty_sentences_in_louisiana_florida.html (reporting 
how a “handful of disproportionately deadly prosecutors” in only a “few isolated 
counties” around the country are continuing to seek the death penalty, while most no 
longer seek death sentences even in cases that might otherwise qualify.). 
20
 See Alkon, supra note 7, at 603–04 (discussing trial penalty); see also An Offer 
You Can’t Refuse: How U.S. Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead 
Guilty, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf 
[hereinafter An Offer You Cant’t Refuse]. 
21
 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN 
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979) (describing how difficult it is for defendants to 
fight even the most minor of criminal cases). 
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guilty and getting out of jail immediately or spending months in jail 
awaiting their trial.
22
 
 
Over the last three decades, Congress and state legislatures 
amended laws to add more potential charges, enhancements, and 
stiffer penalties.  Legislatures amended criminal codes intending to 
give prosecutors more power in the plea bargaining process.
23
  As a 
result, extraordinary prosecutorial power is embedded into criminal 
codes at both the state and federal level.  Prosecutors can threaten to 
file charges with increased maximum penalties and enhancements, and 
they can decide to charge substantially similar offenses as 
misdemeanors or felonies.  A 2013 Human Rights Watch report on 
plea bargaining in the United States gave numerous examples of 
prosecutors exerting pressure on defendants to plead guilty, 
concluding that “coercive plea bargaining tactics abound in state and 
federal criminal cases.”24   
 
The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case that prevents 
prosecutors from using coercive practices.  Instead, the Court has 
sanctioned these practices.  For example, the Court held that it is not a 
due process violation for a prosecutor to threaten to seek the death 
penalty if the defendant rejects the plea deal, as the death penalty 
could be lawfully imposed.
25
  The Court also held that it is not a 
violation if the prosecutor threatens to re-indict the defendant with 
more serious charges if the defendant rejects the plea deal.
26
 
 
The end result of the case law and the structure of criminal 
codes around the country is that prosecutors hold significantly more 
power, and they can, and do, put pressure on defendants to accept plea 
                                                 
22
 This is one reason that bail reform, and releasing defendants on their own 
recognizance can also contribute to lowering incarceration rates as fewer defendants 
may be pressured to accept the deal. See, e.g., Alexander Shalom, Bail Reform as a 
Mass Incarceration Reduction Technique, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 926–27 (2014).      
23
 Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor 
to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1128 (2011); see also William 
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506–07 
(“The definition of crimes and defenses . . . empower[s] prosecutors, who are the 
criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.”). 
24
 An Offer You Can’t Refuse, supra note 20, at 3. 
25 
Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 
26
 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S., 357, 364 (1978). 
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deals.
27
  Complicating the situation, prosecutors’ offices regularly 
evaluate prosecutors based on their conviction rates—a practice that 
can encourage a range of problematic practices, such as discovery 
violations, which sometimes goes hand-in-hand with coercive plea 
bargaining practices.
28
  The decision to file charges
29
 has been 
described as “the most dangerous power of the prosecutor”30 and is 
one that is rarely subject to review.
31
  Criminal codes are structured to 
allow prosecutors wide latitude in deciding what to file.
32
  Prosecutors 
routinely use this power to pressure defendants to take deals or face 
harsher penalties.  Prosecutors operate in a culture where they know 
that once they file charges, the charges will stand, and they will likely 
get convictions through guilty pleas.  This gives prosecutors few 
                                                 
27
 See, e.g., Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse? How the 
American Prosecutor Came to Devour Those He is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN 
L. J. 513, 545 (2012) (“Because a prosecutor can use a single criminal episode 
involving multiple offenses to threaten to pursue all charges possible, he or she can 
significantly raise the defendant’s potential sentence.  When one further considers 
potential sentencing enhancements and mandatory minimums for many crimes, the 
prosecutor can make the cost of going to trial incredibly steep . . . As charges are 
harder to defend against, the prosecutor can create a substantial bargaining chip to 
coerce a plea by overcharging in order to make the cost of losing at trial much 
greater.”). 
28
 See, e.g., Carrie Leonetti, When The Emperor Has No Clothes III:  Personnel 
Policies and Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutor’s Offices, 22 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 53, 69 (2012) (describing internal evaluation and reward structures that focus 
on conviction rates and proposing “the disqualification of entire prosecutorial offices 
from the prosecution of cases when there is an inherent, actual conflict of interest 
arising from the structure of promotion and compensation decisions”); see also 
Davis, supra note 19, at 11. 
29
 In some jurisdictions, such as Texas, felony charges are filed through Grand Jury 
Indictments.  Although this process is different and arguably acts as a check on 
prosecutorial power, prosecutors can control the Grand Jury Indictment process as 
the defense role is extraordinarily limited.  See, e.g., TEX CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
CH. 20.21 (West 2015); TEX CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. CH. 21.01 (West 2009). 
30
 Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the 
Charging Function, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 1259, 1260 (2011) (quoting J. Robert H. 
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 
(1940)). 
31
 Id. 
32 
Due to the structure of the codes it is complicated to define when a prosecutor has 
abused their discretion in filing decisions. See id. at 1279–81(discussing 
overcharging in the context of drafting revisions to the ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards for the Prosecution Function).   
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incentives not to file charges.
33
  These factors contribute to a 
prosecutorial culture that supports, or at the very least, doesn’t 
discourage increased filing of charges, and, as will be discussed 
below, this might be the single most important contributing factor to 
dramatically increased incarceration rates.
34
   
 
II.  PROSECUTORS AND MASS INCARCERATION 
 
One scholar examining the data surrounding incarceration rates 
in the United States is John Pfaff.
35
  Pfaff’s work focuses on the state-
level data provided by just over thirty states. Examining state-level 
data is important, as that is where most incarceration happens.  For 
example, federal incarceration accounts for only 12 percent of the total 
incarcerated population in the United States.
36
  Pfaff has drawn several 
key conclusions from his empirical work.  The first is that drug 
offenses are not the main reason that incarceration rates have soared as 
they account for only 17 percent of those incarcerated.
37
  Pfaff 
acknowledges that drug offenses can drive up incarceration rates as 
they may, for example, be the first offense that is then used for heavier 
sentences in future offenses.
38
 
 
Pfaff disagrees that longer sentences are a significant cause of 
mass incarceration as the amount of time served “has remained 
relatively stable over many years.”39  Pfaff found that median 
                                                 
33
 See, e.g., Rapping, supra note 27, at 543 (“This unchecked discretion to make 
charging decisions, coupled with an ever-expanding criminal code, broader criminal 
liability, and harsher sentences, give the prosecutor unprecedented power over 
citizens. It has become relatively easy for the prosecutor to seek and secure criminal 
convictions and ensure those condemned pay dearly.”). 
34 
See infra Part III. 
35
 See Pfaff, Causes of Prison Growth, supra note 13; John F. Pfaff, The War on 
Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance, Limited Legislative Options, 52 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173 (2015) [hereinafter Pfaff, War on Drugs]; John F. Pfaff, 
Escaping from the Standard Story:  Why the Conventional Wisdom on Prison 
Growth is Wrong, and Where We Can Go from Here, 26 FED. SENT. RPTR. 264 
(2014) [hereinafter Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story]; John F. Pfaff, The 
Durability of Prison Populations, 73 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73 (2010) [hereinafter Pfaff, 
Durability of Prison Populations]. 
36
 See, e.g., Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story, supra note 35, at 270 n.3. 
37
 Id. at 265. 
38
 Id. at 265–66. 
39
 Id. at 267. 
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sentences are “two to four years, with three-fourths of all inmates 
released in about six to eight years,”40 and that such sentences are not 
“throw-away-the key long.”41  However, Pfaff’s data focuses more on 
Northern states, which may not be fully representative.
42
  Pfaff does 
not disagree that some defendants are serving longer sentences and for 
crimes that did not have such lengthy sentences in the past.  Instead, 
Pfaff acknowledges the problem of longer sentences, and what he 
terms long-serving inmates, in contributing to the overall incarceration 
rates, but does not recommend that this is the place to focus attention 
as reducing admissions to prison would have a greater overall impact 
on reducing the incarceration rates.
43
  Pfaff concedes that the current 
laws give “prosecutors bigger hammers to wield during the plea 
bargaining process . . . [which] may enable them to extract guilty pleas 
more quickly.”44 
 
Pfaff states that violence and property crimes are more 
important as drivers of mass incarceration than drug related offenses.
45
  
As Pfaff explains, unlike crime rates in other categories that have been 
decreasing, violent and property crime rates grew.  For example, 
“violent crime grew by 371 percent and property crime by 198 
percent” from 1960-1991.46  What is unclear from these figures—and 
which Pfaff doesn’t address—is how much of this increase is due to 
criminal codes changing their definitions of crimes and making 
something that might have been a misdemeanor a felony or a violent 
felony.   
 
Pfaff concludes that the main driver for mass incarceration is 
prosecutors who are filing more felony charges.
47
  As Pfaff explains, 
the admission to prison rate per criminal filing has not changed, what 
has changed is that a higher percentage of people arrested are 
ultimately charged with crimes as prosecutors decide to file felony 
charges more frequently than they did in previous eras.
48
  
                                                 
40 
Id.  
41 
Id.  
42 
Pfaff, Causes of Prison Growth, supra note 13, at 1241. 
43
 Pfaff, Durability of Prison Populations, supra note 35, at 109. 
44
 Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story, supra note 35, at 267. 
45
 Id. at 266. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Pfaff, Causes of Prison Growth, supra note 13, at 1252. 
48
 Id. at 1243. 
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Pfaff offers some theories as to why prosecutors are charging 
more cases.  One theory is that increased incarceration rates are due to 
“political shifts” where politicians use “tough on crime” approaches to 
voters.
49
  Pfaff argues that these theories are “less salient” today due to 
lower crime rates.
50
  Pfaff also examines the theory that mass 
incarceration is a reaction against the civil rights movement.
51
  
However, there have been few empirical studies of how prosecutors 
make decisions about what charges to file or how they approach plea 
bargaining.
52
  As Pfaff observed, “prosecutors have become 
substantially more aggressive over the past 25 years, for reasons that 
are not yet understood.”53   
 
Pfaff’s work challenges the predominant narrative that mass 
incarceration is due to the war on drugs and longer prison sentences.  
Pfaff doesn’t examine whether changes in the law and the embedded 
power imbalances may be contributing to this prosecutorial culture of 
increasing criminal filings.  Pfaff also doesn’t examine how plea 
bargaining may contribute to mass incarceration and how certain 
reforms may change bargaining behavior by reducing power 
imbalances and thereby contribute to reducing mass incarceration.  
Nor is Pfaff alone.  Michelle Alexander also only briefly touches on 
the relationship between plea bargaining and mass incarceration.
54
  
Although Pfaff disagrees with Alexander’s conclusion about the 
impact of the war on drugs on mass incarceration,
55
 both agree that 
prosecutors are the key players.  As Alexander states, “the prosecutor 
holds the cards” in plea-bargaining.56  One reason that prosecutors 
may be filing a higher percentage of cases than in previous eras is that 
they can expect cases to be easily resolved in the plea bargaining 
process.  This is due, in no small part, to how the laws are currently 
                                                 
49
.Id. at 1261. 
50
 Id. at 1264. 
51
 Id. at 1239. 
52
 For one notable recent exception, see Ronald F. Wright & Kay Levine, The Cure 
for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (2014).   
53
 Pfaff, War on Drugs, supra note 35, at 198. 
54
 ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 84–89, 185–87. 
55
 Pfaff, War on Drugs, supra note 35, at 179 (stating that the New Jim Crow is 
“deeply flawed” and that Alexander’s assertion that “the direct incarceration of 
defendants for drug crimes has driven up prison growth is blatantly false”).   
56
 ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 86. 
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structured, allowing prosecutors to get away with being highly 
aggressive with few checks or limits on that power.   
 
III.  LEGISLATIVE REFORM TO REDUCE PROSECUTORIAL POWER IN 
PLEA BARGAINING 
 
As long as prosecutors hold unfettered power, there is little 
incentive for them to not charge people with crimes when they have 
the evidence to support a conviction.
57
  Simply asking for prosecutors 
to exercise more discretion to return to earlier filing rates, and file 
fewer cases, is unlikely to have the necessary far-reaching impact.
58
  
This means that legislative change, aimed at reducing some 
prosecutorial power, and aimed at making high filing rates less 
attractive, should be part of any meaningful discussion about how to 
reduce incarceration rates.  This is not to suggest that legislative 
reform would be quick or easy,
59
 although some states have started to 
make some of the changes discussed in this section.
60
  This is also not 
                                                 
57
 See, e.g., Miller & Wright, supra note 15 at 134–148 (reporting data from New 
Orleans detailing reasons that prosecutors declined to file charges). The top reasons 
included problems with the evidence and, depending on the type of case, concerns 
about how the evidence was collected. Id. at 136–39. For crimes such as homicide 
and theft, prosecutors declined to file charges due to “law-based judgements,” 
looking at the evidence and whether it fit the legal definition of the crime. Id. at 145. 
58 
Arguably the implementation of Realignment in California is one example of 
asking prosecutors to behave differently. California moved responsibility for  
“supervising, tracking, and imprisoning . . . non-serious, non-violent, non-sexual” 
offenders at the county level, with the hope that it might reduce the number of cases, 
or at least reduce incarceration rates. Realignment has the potential to cost local 
counties more money, as convicted defendants in these categories are no longer sent 
to state prisons, but kept locally. However, at least one early report found that 
prosecutors did not change their charging behavior and still look to “traditional 
severity factors” in deciding what to charge. W. DAVID BALL & ROBERT WEISBERG, 
THE NEW NORMAL?  PROSECUTORIAL CHARGING IN CALIFORNIA AFTER PUBLIC 
SAFETY REALIGNMENT, 7–15 (2014).  
59 
As Michael Vitiello suggests, statewide commissions on criminal justice reform 
can be a useful way to build widespread support for legislative reform.  Discussion 
Group on Reversing Mass Incarceration: What Reforms are Working (or Could 
Work) and Why?" at the South Eastern Association of Law Schools conference in 
Boca Raton, Florida (July 29, 2015) (notes on file with author).   
60
 The State of Sentencing 2014: Developments in Policy and Practice, SENTENCING 
PROJECT, 1 (2014), 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sen_State_of_Sentencing_2014.pdf 
(“At least 16 states and the District of Columbia authorized legislation to address 
sentencing policy, including statutory penalties that limit lengths of confinement.”). 
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to suggest that legislative reform alone will dramatically change how 
prosecutors approach their jobs.  But, legislative reform in a few key 
areas could reduce the pressure put on defendants to accept plea deals 
and might, therefore, help to reduce the number of cases that 
prosecutors file, as extracting guilty pleas will not be as easy.  The 
first suggested category for reform is to change how crimes are 
defined to reduce the number of crimes that can be charged as both 
misdemeanors and felonies and to reduce some felonies to 
misdemeanors.  The second category is to reduce potential punishment 
ranges by eliminating mandatory minimums for most crimes and for 
enhancements.  These reforms would reduce the pressure that 
prosecutors now routinely put on defendants to plead guilty.
61
 
 
A.  Revise How Crimes Are Defined 
 
If a crime is a felony, or potentially a felony, the consequences 
of conviction are more severe.  This can mean more time in jail or 
prison, and the collateral consequences are significantly more serious 
for felony convictions.  Prosecutorial discretion determines which 
charges will be filed, as so many acts can be punished as both felonies 
and misdemeanors.  The threats of re-filing as a felony or reducing to a 
misdemeanor are both powerful threats.  To avoid a felony conviction, 
a defendant may agree to plead guilty to a misdemeanor, even if they 
are innocent or otherwise have a strong defense.
62
  One way to help 
prevent this type of pressure from prosecutors is to redefine crimes 
both by reducing the number that can be charged as both felonies and 
misdemeanors and by reducing some felonies to misdemeanors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 
I make this suggestion aware that there may be unintended consequences, 
especially as making these legislative changes will not, on their own, change the 
underlying prosecutorial cultures. In reality there is no one single prosecutorial 
culture, and prosecutors change how they approach their job over their professional 
lifetimes. See Wright & Levine, supra note 52, at 1068 (“[E]xperienced prosecutors 
say they regret the highly adversarial, even cartoonish, posture they adopted in the 
early years of their careers.”). 
62
 See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the 
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 285 (2011). 
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1.   Reducing the Number of Acts that Can Be Charged as 
Either Felonies or Misdemeanors 
 
Theft offenses and assaults are two common types of crimes 
that can be charged as both misdemeanors and felonies, depending on 
the seriousness of the offense.  For example, an assault that includes 
serious bodily injury is more likely to be a felony.
63
  Likewise, a theft 
that involves property that is worth over a certain amount of money 
(for example, $2,500.00) is often a felony.
64
  Prior offenses can also be 
a factor.  For example, petty theft with a prior conviction can be 
charged as a felony or a misdemeanor in California, regardless of the 
value of the stolen property.
65
   
 
Some of these distinctions make sense and shouldn’t be 
eliminated.  For example, a spousal battery where there is serious 
bodily injury is clearly a more serious crime than a simple punch or 
single slap.  But some of these distinctions simply allow prosecutors to 
exert pressure during the plea bargaining process to encourage 
defendants to take the plea deal.
66
  In addition, if a prosecutor has 
more options and can file the same case as either a felony or a 
misdemeanor, it may mean that they are more likely to file the case, 
thereby contributing to the increase in the percentage of case filings 
from arrests.
67
  Legislatures should review the full list of criminal 
                                                 
63
 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b) (West 2015) (stating that an assault is 
a misdemeanor unless it is carried out against certain categories of people, such as a 
public servant); id. at § 22.02 (defining an aggravated assault as a felony when there 
is “serious bodily injury”). 
64
 Id. at § 31.03(e)(4) defines theft generally and under § 31.03(e) lists what qualifies 
as misdemeanors and felonies. For example, § 31.03(e)(4)(A) defines theft as a state 
jail felony when “the value of the property stolen is $2,500 or more but less than 
$30,000, or the property is less than 10 head of sheep, swine, or goats or any part 
thereof under the value of $30,000.” 
65
 Id. at § 22.01(b-1)(2). 
66
 One empirical study found that when there are more options to choose from in the 
criminal code, prosecutors are more likely to reduce the charges, which may mean 
that more serious charges are likely used as leverage to encourage defendants to take 
the better deals. See Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and 
Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 
N.C.L. REV. 1935, 1940 (2006). 
67
 It is also possible that prosecutors may make worse deals if they have fewer 
options embedded into the codes, particularly if they don’t reduce the number of 
cases that are filed.  See id. 
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charges that can be filed as both misdemeanors or felonies and make 
sure the distinctions support a real public policy objective and are not 
simply there to add to the arsenal of charges that prosecutors can file.  
One simple proposal is to eliminate petty theft with a prior as a felony 
charge.  If the amount stolen is a small amount and not enough to rise 
to the level of a felony, it should stay a misdemeanor, regardless of the 
record of the defendant.  
 
2.  Reducing Felonies to Misdemeanors 
 
Related to reducing or eliminating crimes that can be both 
misdemeanors and felonies is reducing crimes from felonies to 
misdemeanors.  For example, Proposition 47, which passed in 
California in November 2014, reduced some felonies to 
misdemeanors, including drug and property crimes.
68
  It is still too 
early to evaluate the long-term impact.  Early reports indicate that 
arrests are down dramatically for narcotics offenses, which are no 
longer felonies.
69
  Overall, in Los Angeles County, narcotics arrests 
decreased by 30 percent and overall bookings into the Los Angeles 
County Jail were down by 23 percent in the initial months after the 
adoption of Proposition 47.
70
  It is unclear how Proposition 47 is 
impacting plea bargaining or prosecutorial behavior.  If the long-term 
impact is a reduction in arrests, this would reduce the number of cases 
that prosecutors can ultimately file, although without prosecutorial 
involvement or impacting the relative power that prosecutors hold in 
the system.  One unknown is the impact that having fewer arrests, and 
thereby fewer potential cases to file, may have on prosecutors’ 
institutional culture.  Will seeing fewer cases reduce the punitive 
approach by prosecutors?  It is clear that if California’s initial 
experience continues, and there are fewer arrests, this change in law 
                                                 
68 
Marisa Gerber et al., Prop 47 Brings a Shift to Longer Time Spent Behind Bars, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-early-release-
20150128-story.html#page=1. Proposition 47 also allowed those who have already 
been sentenced to be re-sentenced under the new law. See, e.g., J. RICHARD 
COUZENS & TRICIA A. BIGELOW, PROPOSITION 47: “THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND 
SCHOOLS ACT” 33–64 (2014), http://www.adi-
sandiego.com/pdf_forms/PROPOSITION_47_by_Couzens_and_Bigelow_Decembe
r_2014.pdf (explaining to judges, in part, how to apply the retroactive portions of the 
law both in terms of re-classifying offenses as misdemeanors and re-sentencing.). 
69 
See Gerber, supra note 68. 
70
 Id.  
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will reduce incarceration rates, albeit for reasons not necessarily 
envisioned by the voters who likely thought Proposition 47 would just 
reduce felony convictions rates, not arrest rates.
71
 
 
B.  Eliminate Most Mandatory Sentences 
 
Both state and federal criminal codes include a large number of 
mandatory minimum sentences both for the underlying criminal 
charge and for added enhancements.
72
  If a defendant is convicted at 
trial of a crime or an enhancement that includes a mandatory minimum 
sentence, the judge usually has no choice but to impose the sentence.
73
  
The practical effect of mandatory minimums is to give prosecutors 
more power as the threat of adding an enhancement with a mandatory 
minimum or proceeding on a charge with a mandatory minimum can 
mean that the defendant will get significantly more time if they are 
convicted and do not accept the plea deal.
74
  In all but the most serious 
of crimes, legislatures should remove mandatory minimums from 
criminal codes both for the underlying offense and for enhancements. 
 
1.  Eliminating Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Most 
Charges 
 
Mandatory minimums should be reserved for only the most 
serious crimes.
75
  Currently, mandatory minimums exist for everything 
                                                 
71
 The arguments in favor of Proposition 47 in the Voter Information Guide did not 
include that it would reduce arrest rates. See California Secretary of State, 
Proposition 47, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, 
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/en/propositions/47/arguments-rebuttals.htm (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
72
 See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)Ministering Justice: A Prosecutor’s Ethical 
Duty to Support Sentencing Reform, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 981, 987–91 (2014). 
73 
Judges, particularly federal judges, regularly complain about mandatory sentences.  
See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 10 (“As stated in a September 2012 letter to Congress 
submitted by the Judicial Conference of the United States . . . ‘For sixty years, the 
Judicial Conference has consistently and vigorously opposed mandatory minimum 
sentences and has supported measures for their repeal or to ameliorate their 
effects.’”). 
74
 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
75 
See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 72, at 999–1001 (arguing that since ABA Model 
Rule 3.8 states that prosecutors, as “ministers of justice,” should take “special 
precautions” to prevent the conviction of innocent people, prosecutors have an 
ethical duty to actively advocate for the “repeal of most mandatory sentences”). 
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ranging from less serious misdemeanors to murder.  For example, 
driving under the influence of alcohol, if the blood alcohol level is 
over a certain amount, often includes mandatory jail time.
76
  At the 
other extreme is California’s three-strike law, which mandates a term 
of 25 years to life for conviction of a third strike offense.
77
  For the 
purposes of this discussion, to aid in reducing mass incarceration, the 
concern is about mandatory minimums that carry significant potential 
time in prison.  For a variety of reasons, including practical political 
constraints, it may make sense to continue to have mandatory 
minimums for violent crimes
78
 such as murder in the first degree.
79
  
The clear category of crimes to focus on first is to remove mandatory 
minimums for non-violent offenses.
80
  This would mean focusing on 
drug cases and theft cases.  Pfaff’s research supports focusing on 
property offenses as he identifies this category of offenses as being 
part of the reason for increased incarceration rates because of the 
overall increase in property crime rates.
81
  Each state should carefully 
                                                 
76 
For example, Idaho has a mandatory minimum of ten days in jail, 48 hours to be 
served consecutively, for anyone convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol 
with a blood alcohol content over .20. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8004C (West 2015). 
77
 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (West 2015). 
78 
See, e.g., Dana Goldstein, Too Old to Commit Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/sunday-review/too-old-to-commit-
crime.html?_r=0 (noting that although some reformers argue that there is no need for 
longer sentences even in the most serious crimes, most people “age out” of criminal 
conduct and are therefore far less likely to reoffend).  
79 
First degree murder carries three possible sentences in California: twenty-five 
years to life in prison; life in prison without the possibility of parole; and the death 
penalty. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189-190 (West 2015). 
80
 See Obama, supra note 2 (President Obama suggested this focus for federal 
legislative reform); see, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 262–63 (noting that 
others argue that only looking at non-serious, non-violent, non-sexual offenders 
leaves out too many types of offenses to meaningfully reduce incarceration rates).   
81
 But see, John Pfaff, For True Penal Reform, Focus on the Violent Offenders, 
WASH. POST (July 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/for-true-
penal-reform-focus-on-the-violent-offenders/2015/07/26/1340ad4c-3208-11e5-97ae-
30a30cca95d7_story.html (“[F]or all the talk about nonviolent offenders, a majority 
of our prisoners have been convicted of a violent act and even more have some 
history of violence. . . . [A]t some point we are going to have to reduce the 
punishments that violent offenders face if we really want to cut our breathtaking 
prison population down to size.”); see also GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 195 
(analyzing the background and challenge of considering reform for more serious 
cases and arguing that “meaningful penal reform” requires also reforming the long 
sentences for serious and violent offenses and not considering certain categories of 
crimes to be off-limits to sentencing reform).  
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examine how non-violent property crimes and drug crimes are 
punished and eliminate mandatory minimums in these categories.  
 
2.  Eliminating Mandatory Minimum Sentences in 
Enhancements 
 
Prosecutors routinely threaten to add enhancements, such as 
the use of a gun, that include mandatory minimum sentences in order 
to put pressure on defendants to plead guilty.  Although at first glance 
many enhancements support clear policy goals, such as discouraging 
the use of a gun during the commission of a felony, the mandatory 
sentences often exceed the stated reason for the enhancement.  For 
example, the use of a gun regularly carries mandatory minimums of a 
decade or more in prison.
82
  There are questions about what is added, 
from a public policy point of view, by these enhancements.  For 
example, if a gun is used and causes serious bodily injury, the 
underlying offense—assault with serious bodily injury—would 
include increased punishment for the injury.  In that example, the gun 
use enhancement simply acts to put additional pressure on a defendant 
to take a deal, as the penalty can be so much more severe.  Most codes 
allow for a great variety of enhancements based on where the crime 
was committed (i.e. was the defendant in a school zone?);
83
 what was 
used (a gun or other deadly weapon?);
84
 and whether the defendant has 
prior convictions.
85
  Legislative reform needs to include a full 
overhaul of which enhancements are allowed, eliminate mandatory 
sentences, and reduce the time for enhancements.  Mandatory 
minimums in enhancements give prosecutors tremendous power to 
pressure defendants to plead guilty in exchange for an offer to strike 
the enhancement or not add it in the first place. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Can legislative reform help to change the culture of plea 
bargaining and thereby help to reduce mass incarceration?  The simple 
                                                 
82 
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.087(2) (West 2015) (noting that the “[D]ischarge 
[of] a “firearm” or “destructive device” as defined in § 790.001 shall be sentenced to 
a minimum term of imprisonment of 20 years.”). 
83
 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.134 (West 2015). 
84 
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022 (West 2015). 
85 
See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West 2015). 
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answer is yes.  If prosecutors don’t have the option to file a felony 
charge, it reduces the pressure they can put on a defendant to plead 
guilty.  Likewise, if prosecutors cannot add enhancements that include 
mandatory prison time, the pressure put on defendants to plead guilty 
might be reduced.  And, if prosecutors don’t have the option to charge 
the same offense as a misdemeanor or a felony, but must charge it as a 
misdemeanor, the pressure put on defendants to plead guilty will be 
reduced.  This could mean fewer cases are filed and reducing filing 
rates could help to reduce overall incarceration rates. 
 
In addition, reducing the pressure on defendants to plead guilty 
can result in higher trial rates.  This means that prosecutors will in turn 
have to be prepared to spend time and resources to try cases that may 
be weak, rather than relying on defendants nearly always taking the 
deal.  Threatening trial is often the only real power that a defendant 
has to put leverage on the prosecutor to make a better deal or dismiss 
the case.  However, under current laws, many defendants cannot risk a 
trial due to mandatory minimums, enhancements, or threats to file the 
charge as a felony.
86
  Reforming criminal codes to reduce when and 
how prosecutors can make these threats can contribute to changing 
how prosecutors approach their jobs.   
 
Clearly these are not quick fixes.  Prosecutors have had 
decades to use these extraordinary powers and the institutional 
cultures within many prosecutorial agencies will likely resist moving 
beyond punitive approaches.  Nonetheless, although simple legislative 
change is not a cure-all, it is one approach to change the deeply 
embedded structural power imbalances in the plea bargaining process 
that contribute to the problem of mass incarceration. 
 
 
                                                 
86
 See Alkon, supra note 7, at 605–08 (discussing the reasons defendants often 
cannot use trial as leverage, including the potential trial penalty).  
